Criminal Court of the City of New York, People v. Tiffany by Monastero, Deborah A.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 18 
Number 2 New York State Constitutional 
Decisions: 2001 Compilation 
Article 15 
March 2016 
Criminal Court of the City of New York, People v. Tiffany 
Deborah A. Monastero 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Monastero, Deborah A. (2016) "Criminal Court of the City of New York, People v. Tiffany," Touro Law 
Review: Vol. 18 : No. 2 , Article 15. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/15 
This Free Speech is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
CRIMINAL COURT
OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK
People v. Tiffany'
(decided January 30, 2001)
William Tiffany was charged with aggravated harassment
in the second degree and harassment in the second degree in
violation of New York Penal Law § 240.30 (1) and § 240.26 (3)
respectively.2 Although Tiffany moved for dismissal of both
counts, he argued that Penal Law § 240.30(1)3 was
unconstitutionally overbroad and violated the First4 and Fourteenth
Amendments5 of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 8 of the New York State Constitution.6  The court held
that the aggravated harassment statute was not unconstitutional and
therefore denied Tiffany's motion to dismiss.
7
The complaint of aggravated harassment was based on
numerous threatening phone calls Tiffany allegedly made to a
woman with whom he previously shared a relationship.8 Although
Tiffany did not identify himself, the complainant told the
authorities she recognized the caller's voice and identified him.9
The caller threatened "to kill her and put a bullet in her head, to
'186 Misc. 2d 917, 721 N.Y.S.2d 741 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2001).
2id.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (1) (McKinney 2000). The statute provides in
pertinent part: "[C]ommunicates, or causes a communication to be initiated by
mechanical or electronic means or otherwise,. . .by telephone ... in a manner
likely to cause annoyance or alarm."
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech ......
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law ...."
6 N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. The New York Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "Every citizen may freely speak ... no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or the press."
Tiffany, 186 Misc. 2d at 922, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
8 Id. at 918, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 742. (The defendant allegedly called the
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make her life a living hell, and if she saw anyone else he would kill
her."' °
Tiffany argued that the court should follow People v.
Dietze," where N.Y. Penal Law § 240.2512 was held
unconstitutionally overbroad. In Dietze, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction of harassment and
held that the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the New
York State Constitution.13 The Dietze court found the statute, on
its face, proscribed a significant amount of protected expression,
and could subject an individual to prosecution for exercising their
right to engage in free speech. '
4
In Dietz, the defendant approached the complainant and her
son, who were both mentally retarded, and called the complainant
a "bitch" and her son a "dog," and also stated that she would "beat
the crap out of the [complainant] some day or night on the
street."15 The court found the defendant's conduct to be "abusive"
and also found the defendant had the requisite intent to "harass" or
"annoy," which was proscribed by the statute.' 6 However, the
court did find the defendant's speech to be protected by the Federal
and New York State Constitutions. 7 The court stated that speech
is often "abusive" - even vulgar, derisive, and provocative - and
yet it is still protected under the state and federal constitutional
guarantees of free expression unless it is much more than that.'8 In
order to constitutionally proscribe speech, it must put the
complaining party in "clear and present danger of some substantive
evil, and this statute failed to do so."' 9
10 Id.
" 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d 595 (1989).
12 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 2000) provides in pertinent part: "A
person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm
another person ... he uses abusive or obscene language ......
13 Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 1167, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
14 id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
I7d.
"' Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 1168, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
'9 Id. (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)).
294 [Vol 18
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The Tiffany court began its constitutional analysis of the
statute by discussing the long-standing judicial policy of
presuming a state statute's constitutionality, and attempting to
uphold its constitutionality whenever possible.20 The court then
distinguished the holding in Dietze by focusing on the fact that the
statute at issue in this case, Penal Law § 240.30(1), merely
proscribed abusive speech.2 Conversely, in Tiffany, Penal Law
§ 240.25 proscribed speech that is likely to cause alarm or
annoyance, and that type of speech is not afforded protection by
22either the Federal or the New York State Constitutions. The
court further distinguished Dietze by noting that the statute in
Dietze was held unconstitutional after a full analysis during trial,
whereas in this case the defendant was seeking to have the charges
dismissed prior to trial. 23 Accordingly, the standard utilized when
considering dismissal of charges prior to trial is less than beyond a
reasonable doubt, which is the standard used at trial.24 The court
further held that "possession of a telephone does not constitute an
open invitation to uninvited abuse. 25
In People v. Shack,26 the defendant, who was convicted of
aggravated harassment in the second degree in violation of New
York Penal Law § 240.30(2) argued that the statute violated the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the New York Constitution
because it was impermissibly overbroad .2  Additionally, the
defendant argued that even if the statute was found t.o be
20 Tiffany, 186 Misc. 2d at 920, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 id. at 921, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
24 Id
25 Tiffany, 186 Misc. 2d at 920, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (citing People v.
Minguez, 147 Misc. 2d 482, 556 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Crim. Ct. New York County
1990)).
2686 N.Y.2d 529, 658 N.E.2d 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1995).
27 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30(2) (McKinney 2000). The statute states in
pertinent part: "A person is guilty of... when, with intent to harass, annoy,
threaten or alarm another person .... makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication."
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constitutional, it was unconstitutional as applied to him. 29 The
defendant specifically argued that the statute proscribed
communication 'ather than conduct, and therefore wrongly
criminalized expressions that are constitutionally protected .3
In Shack, the defendant suffered from a mental illness, and
communicated by telephone with his cousin, a psychologist, who
resided out of state. 1 Initially, the telephone communication was
acceptable, so long as the defendant continued his treatment with a
32psychiatrist and took his medications. A few months later,
however, the defendant informed his cousin that he was no longer
taking his medication.33 Pursuant to their arrangement, the cousin
informed the defendant that his phone calls were no longer
welcome.34 The defendant thereafter called her continuously and
left threatening messages on her answering machine. 5
The court noted the statute did not criminalize speech or
expression, but rather conduct. 36 Additionally, the statute had a
"limiting clause," which proscribed the conduct of making
telephone calls "without any purpose of legitimate
communication., 3 7  The court held the "limiting clause"
distinguishes this statute from those that proscribe "pure speech,"
and as such, the statute is not constitutionally overbroad.38 The
court further noted that even if the statute did proscribe speech, it
would not necessarily be determinative of its overbreadth.3 9 The
court stated that a person's right to free speech is at times limited
2 9 Id.
30 Id. at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
31 Id. at 533, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
32 Id. (From the period of June through October, they had approximately two
telephone conversations each week).
33 Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 533, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
34 Id. at 534, 658 N.E.2d at 709, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
35 Id. (From December 12 through May 20, defendant made 185 calls to his
cousin).
36 id. at 535, 658 N.E.2d at 710, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664. (The statute
criminalized harassing telephone calls).
37 Id.
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and has never encompassed "absolute protection., 40 Furthermore,
the court found that the statute was constitutional as applied to the
defendant because his criminal liability arose from his harassing
conduct rather than from any expression of constitutionally
protected speech. 4' The defendant further argued that the statute
was overbroad because it may "chill" people from engaging in
constitutionally protected speech.42  In order to find a statute
unconstitutional because it has a "chilling" effect, the statute must
be "substantially overbroad." 43  Again, the court looked to the
statute's limiting clause and distinguished this statute from others
that have been held unconstitutionally overbroad." The court
added that even if there may be a rare instance where the statute
may reach protected expression, it cannot find the statute
overbroad in theory, unless it is "substantially overbroad. ' '45 For
the aforementioned reasons, the court found the defendant's
arguments unpersuasive.
Similarly, in Cohen v. California,47 the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether offensive words
imprinted on one's jacket are constitutionally protected. The
defendant was arrested and convicted of disturbing the peace in
violation of California Penal Code § 415,4 for wearing a jacket in
a Los Angeles courthouse with the words "[-]uck the Draft" plainly
visible.49  The defendant's purpose in having these words
40 Id. (noting that a person's right to free speech may be "curtailed" when
substantial privacy interests of others are invaded.)
41 id. at 536, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
42 Id. at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (arguing that patients
may fear criminal liability should they argue with their mental health provider
during a phone conversation).
43 Shack, 86 N.Y.2d at 537, 658 N.E.2d at 711, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (noting
that in order to find a statute unconstitutionally overbroad, the statute must be so




46 Id. at 542, 658 N.E.2d at 714, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
47 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
48 CAL. PENAL CODE § 415. The statute provides in pertinent part,
"[M]aliciously and willfully disturbing the peace or quiet of any neighborhood
or person. . . by. . .offensive conduct."
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imprinted on his jacket was "a means of informing the public of
the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the draft."' 50
The defendant argued that the statue, as applied to the facts of his
case, denied him the right of freedom of expression inherent under
both the First5 ' and Fourteenth5 2 Amendments of the Federal
Constitution.53  The United States Supreme Court found that
Cohen's conviction was based on the "offensiveness" of the words
that his message conveyed to the public, and not his conduct.54
Therefore, his conviction was a result of his exercising his right to
engage in free speech.55
The Court explained that "freedom of speech [is] protected
from arbitrary governmental interference by the Constitution and
[proscription of such speech] can be justified, if at all, only as a
valid regulation of the manner in which he exercised that freedom,
not as a permissible prohibition on the substantive message it
conveys. 56 Furthermore, the Court noted that the Constitution has
never afforded "absolute protection to every individual to speak
whenever or wherever he pleases, or to use any form of address in
any circumstances that he chooses. 57 Although the Court found
Cohen's jacket "distasteful," the message it conveyed was
constitutionally protected.58  "The constitutional right of free
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and
populous as ours." 59
The Federal Constitution affords broad protection to
freedom of speech, and the New York State Constitution confers
50/d.
51 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech..."52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law. .
53 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18.
4 Id. at 18.
55 Id.5 1d. at 19
57 Id.
58 Cohen, 403 U.S at 26.59 Id. at 24.
298 [Vol 18
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an even more expansive view.60 However, both the Federal and
New York State Constitutions have never afforded "absolute
protection" to free speech.61 When determining whether or not
speech is constitutionally protected, the New York courts look for
guidance from the federal system.62 The Federal Constitution
allows for the proscription of speech that constitutes "fighting
words, 63 presents a "clear and present danger,' 64 and "true
threats. 65 Freedom of speech has always been invaluable in an
open society, and is only restricted in the narrowest of
circumstances, as it should be.
Deborah A. Monastero
60 State v. Prisinzano, 170 Misc. 2d 525, 528, 648 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1996) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss for threatening
replacement employees by stating "[Wlhen the cops leave, the blood is going to
run off your bald [-lucking head"; "Once the police leave, I'm going to get
you"; and "[O]nce the police leave you'll get yours.")
61 id.
62 See Prisinzano, 170 Misc. 2d at 525, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 267; Shack, 86 N.Y.2d
at 529, 658 N.E.2d at 706, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 660; Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d at 47, 549
N.E.2d at 1166, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 595; People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253
N.E.2d 202, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (noting that in order to
constitute fighting words, it must be established that; 1) the speaker must
address his words directly to a specific individual; 2) the encounter must be face
to face; 3) the words must be likely to provoke the average addressee to violence
under the circumstances; and 4) the threat of such violent response must be
imminent.); Prisinzano, 170 Misc.2d at 529, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
64 Prisinzano, 170 Misc.2d at 533, 648 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (noting that
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), established the modern "clear and
present danger" test as: "1) the content-of the speech advocates the use of force
or violation of law; 2) the speaker intends to incite or produce a violation of law;
3) there exists a likelihood that lawless response will occur and 4) such a lawless
response is imminent").
65 Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (noting that to constitute a "true threat"
the speaker must utter the words and have the intent of threatening physical
injury, not necessarily carrying out the threat); Prisinzano, 170 Misc.2d at 536,
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